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1 Introduction
The use of incentive-based regulatory mechanisms to deal with environmental problems has
received increasing attention in the literature over the last years. The standard model presents
one (or several) agents who posses relevant private information concerning either their private
costs or the eﬀect of their performance on the environment.1 We extend this standard model in
two closely related ways. First, in those situations where the informational advantage concerns
the environmental impact of an economic activity, and not an intrinsic cost parameter, the
standard model can be unrealistic. Since the source of the informative advantage with respect
to the regulator is extrinsic to the Þrm, this advantage may not be perfect and the Þrms may
need to engage in costly searching to gather information concerning their type. Second, another
important characteristic of environmental problems that has usually not been captured in the
literature is the existence of pressure groups, such as the environmentalists, who may have access
to some relevant information, and who have strong incentives in aﬀecting the regulatory process.
In this respect, Lewis (1996), when presenting the areas of future research in environmental
regulation, raises as an important issue the development of strategies for information acquisition
and speciÞcally considers the role of interested parties with stakes in the regulation, as potential
information providers.
The aim of this paper is to develop a model of environmental regulation under adverse
selection where we study the implications of the existence of ignorance, understood as the
possibility that the Þrm is not sure about its type when signing the contract. We also analyze
the impact of the presence of third-parties with access to relevant information. We consider the
regulation of a Þrm that is chosen to undertake a public project with a Þxed social value, but
that generates environmental damage.2 We assume that the information available to the Þrm
as to the type of project it is endowed with (highly damaging or not), is not perfect.
We Þrst consider the design of the optimal regulatory contract in the absence of informed
third-parties. We show that there exists a positive lower bound in the degree of ignorance,
from which on the contract is pooling for those Þrms who do not know the type of project
they are endowed with (the ignorants) and those who have a highly damaging project (the
ineﬃcient Þrms). We then introduce a potentially informed third-party who can costly gather
some relevant information about the Þrms type. We analyze which is the best position for this
party in the timing, from the principals perspective. In other words, we study whether it is more
eﬃcient to ask him to reveal his information at the beginning of the regulatory process (using
him as a Þlter) or at the end (using him as a check to threaten those Þrms who misreport their
type). We independently study two diﬀerent kinds of parties. On the one hand, we analyze the
impact of informed environmentalists, that we assume to only care about environmental quality.
Therefore, they will only disclose their information if it leads to a lower level of pollution. On
1For a general overview of these models see Lewis (1996).
2A similar starting point was used by Boyer and Laﬀont (1999). They develop a study on the optimal
instrument choice for environmental regulation, but their aim is completely diﬀerent from ours since they focus
on an incomplete contract approach to political economy.
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the other hand, we also present the situation where the regulator has the possibility of using
an unbiased expert who has access to a certain degree of information, and who will always be
willing to disclose it. In both conÞgurations, we show that the position of third-party has no
direct eﬀect on the contract. That is, in this setting their optimal location in the timing is only
determined by the overall costs of gathering information.
We Þnally identify when does the game with experts dominate that with environmentalists.
Not surprisingly, we Þnd that there is a threshold level for the cost of raising public funds, from
which on it is not worth using experts (they have to be compensated for the searching costs in
which they incur). More surprisingly, we Þnd that for relatively low levels of ignorance, by using
experts instead of environmentalists, we have no allocative eﬃciency gain. That is, the contracts
in the two cases are equivalent. Even if the environmentalists do not disclose all the information
they have, the optimal contract with experts and with environmentalists is the same, and hence
the overall relevant information in the system is unaltered. The reason is that for low levels of
ignorance, the contract is pooling for two types of Þrms (the ignorant and the ineﬃcient). The
diﬀerence in the information disclosure aﬀects only this part of the population leading, therefore,
to the same contract.
We Þrst perform all the analysis when the level of ignorance is exogenously Þxed. In the last
part of the paper we consider that the degree of ignorance is a choice variable of the Þrm. For
the type of problem we are dealing with, it is natural to assume that the Þrms decision on its
level of information acquisition is unobservable for the principal. Consequently, we develop our
analysis for an information gathering decision that is simultaneous to the design of the contract.
We Þnd that the regulators choice on the level of information is more extreme than the Þrms. If
the Þrms decision is to acquire a low degree of information, the regulator would choose a lower
level. Conversely, if the Þrm chooses to be well informed, the principals choice of information
would be even higher.
The timing selection with endogenous ignorance has to take into account the bias in the
Þrms choice of information with respect to the social optimum, as well as the incentives the
alternative timings give for the Þrms information gathering.
The analysis we perform has some policy implications that are worth noting. First, we can
interpret the problem on the selection of the optimal timing, as a choice of who should take the
initiative in the assessment of the impact of the project. A timing with the third-parties placed
at the end of the process gives the Þrm the initiative in the assessment, while a timing with the
third parties as a Þlter corresponds to a situation in which the public powers take this initiative.
Our results support the second alternative as optimal, provided the extra cost of public funds
is not too high. This goes in favor of the existing E.U. legislation concerning the assessment of
the impact of public and private projects on the environment.
Our analysis can also be a useful starting point for the study of the implications of relying
on interested parties information. It provides some insights about the beneÞts (acquisition of
information at a lower costs) and the drawbacks (the bias that their selÞsh motivation places
on the information disclosure) of using an interested party to acquire information. The design
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of future policies could be improved if the policymaker proÞted from the information acquired
by agents with personal interests in the Þeld.
In the literature, the possibility of facing an imperfectly informed agent was Þrst addressed by
Lewis and Sappington (1993) in the context of a general adverse selection problem. There, they
construct the optimal contract for an agent who suﬀers from an exogenous level of ignorance.
This ignorance is present in the form of a given probability that the Þrm shares only the same
imperfect information as the principal. The resulting contract diﬀers widely from the standard
adverse selection one, since pooling and discontinuities appear. More recently, Kessler (1998)
introduces the possibility of endogeneizing the level of ignorance, and shows that the agent will
never be interested in being perfectly informed, and therefore, that the lack of information has a
certain strategic value. Contrary to our approach, Kesslers analysis is performed in a sequential
setting in which the Þrms decision to acquire information is prior to the design of the contract.
However, she does not study the relation among the incentives of the principal and those of the
Þrm, and does not include in her analysis the presence of informed third-parties. In a similar
setting, and also in a two states of nature framework, Cre´mer and Khalil (1994), construct the
optimal contract that a principal would oﬀer to an agent that is either perfectly informed or not
informed at all about the realization of the random variable.3
Milgrom and Roberts (1986), develop an interesting analysis of how a decisionmaker can
beneÞt from the information of interested parties. Their model focuses on the design of optimal
information acquisition strategies and hence, takes a more mechanism design approach than our
work. Moreover, their results can not be directly applied in our context since the interested
party in our game is only perfectly informed (contrary to their framework), and may actually
have no relevant information available for the principal.
The remaining of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 develops
the problem of an exogenous and partial level of ignorance. Section 4 analyzes the impact of the
presence of informed third parties (environmentalists and experts). Section 5 investigates the
consequences of endogeneizing the level of ignorance. Finally, Section 6 brießy concludes and
elaborates on the policy implications of the analysis performed. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a regulator who delegates the realization of a public project to a Þrm. Let S
represent the social value of the project, which for simplicity is assumed to be large enough
to make the realization always desirable. Its implementation generates environmental damage
according to the function V (α, e), where e is the eﬀort exerted by the Þrm in order to preserve the
environment from damage (unobservable for the principal), and α represents the type of project.
The higher is the value of α the more eﬀect has the Þrms eﬀort in reducing the environmental
impact of the project.
We assume that V (α, e) is ex-post veriÞable as a whole, but not its components. This means
3The same analysis with more than two states of nature is performed in Cre´mer and Khalil (1998).
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that once the project is Þnished, the principal can evaluate the overall amount of damage that
it caused, but he cannot infer whether the pollution came from a bad project or a Þrm exerting
a low eﬀort.
In order to be able to derive explicit solutions, we consider the speciÞc damage function
V (α, e) = D − αe, with D being a given constant. We assume that α can take two values, and
its domain is α ∈ {α, α¯}, with α = 1. This construction allows us to discuss some comparative
statics in terms of the relative advantage of one project over the other as a function of α¯.
Moreover we take the value of α¯ as belonging to (1, 2).4 The prior probability that the project
is eﬃcient is v = Pr(α = α¯). Hence, the expected eﬃciency parameter of the project is:
α = E(α) = vα¯+ (1− v) = 1+ v (α¯− 1) . (1)
Notice that, with this construction, ex-ante there are not two types of Þrms, but two types of
projects. The problem becomes an adverse selection one only if the Þrm (and not the regulator)
gets to know the type of project it is entitled with, before the contract is signed. Then, a Þrm
that knows its project is eﬃcient becomes a low-polluting Þrm, and if it knows it is ineﬃcient,
it becomes a high-polluting one. In other words, even if we consider an environmental prob-
lem where the source of the informational problem is extrinsic to the Þrm (and not a private
technological parameter), we refer to a Þrm by the type of project it is endowed with.
The cost of the pollution abatement eﬀort of the Þrm is given by Ψ(e), with Ψ0 > 0, Ψ00 ≥ 0,
Ψ000 ≥ 0.5
We denote by t the transfer to the regulated Þrm. The public funds expended by the
regulator have a marginal cost 1+ λ, with λ > 0, due to the distortionary impact of taxation in
the economy.6 According to this, the consumers welfare is:
CS = S − V (α, e)− (1+ λ)t.
The Þrms proÞts are:
U = t−Ψ(e).
The social welfare, given by the sum of the consumers surplus and the Þrms proÞts is:
W = CS + U = S − V (α, e)− (1+ λ)Ψ(e)− λU. (2)
Finally, note that we have constructed the model assuming that the social planner puts equal
weight to the consumers surplus and the proÞts of the Þrm in the objective function, but that
4We restrict the domain of α¯ in order to avoid dealing with degenerated situations like having an extremely
eﬃcient project (very high value of α¯). With the domain chosen here the good project is never more than twice
as eﬃcient as the bad one.
5The assumption Ψ000 ≥ 0 is usual in this models to ensure that the regulators objective function is concave
and that optimal contract is deterministic. See, for instance, Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) page 35.
6The inclusion of a distortion λ > 0 is usual in regulatory problems. It is also supported by stylized facts,
according to Jones, Tandon and Vogelsand (1990), the mean value of λ for the developed countries can be
considered of the order of 0.3, and even higher in developing ones.
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due to the extra costs of public funds (λ), eventually he wants to make the Þrms rent the
smallest possible. An alternative construction is to assume that the public expenditures are not
penalized, but that the consumers surplus has a higher weight than the Þrms proÞts in the
objective function. This would generate a very similar model. In particular, the regulator would
still be interested in minimizing the Þrms informational rents.
3 Regulation under Exogenous Partial Ignorance
In this section we present a situation where the only players involved are the regulator and the
Þrm and in which the Þrm has some degree of informational advantage over the regulator, but
this advantage is not perfect. We assume that the Þrm knows the type of project only with a
certain probability, that by now, we take as exogenously given. We model it by considering that
the Þrm, before signing the contract improves its informational status by means of a signal sF ,
deÞned as follows:
sF = {α} with probability x
sF = {∅} with probability 1− x.
As we are dealing with an exogenous level of ignorance, the Þrm takes the value of x as given
and we ignore the cost of this level of information: either the signal was costless, or if costly it
was purchased before the starting point of our analysis.
The informational structure determines the existence of three types of Þrms: the ones that
know that their project is eﬃcient, the ones that know it is ineﬃcient, and the ones who do not
know the type of project they are endowed with. We will refer to them as the eﬃcient type, the
ineﬃcient type and the ignorants.
The objective function of the regulator under partial ignorance (W I) is the following:
EW = (1− x) ¡S − V (bα, eI)− (1+ λ)Ψ(eI)− λUI¢+
x
£
v
¡
S − V (α¯, e)− (1+ λ)Ψ(e)− λU¢+ (1− v) (S − V (1, e)− (1+ λ)Ψ(e)− λU)¤ .
The Þrst-best choice of the regulator if it did not suﬀered from asymmetric information, would
be given by a reimbursement of the costs (t = Ψ(e)) where the optimal eﬀort e is the one that
equates the marginal cost with the expected marginal reduction in environmental damage. If
both, the Þrm and the regulator, suﬀered from full ignorance, the optimal level of eﬀort would
be determined by the expected type of project (bα).
Assume now that the type of the Þrm is unknown. The fact that V (α, e) is ex-post veriÞable
implies that the principal can commit to severely punish any Þrm signing a contract that ex-
post is revealed unfulÞlled. That is, the Þrm will only dare to exert a level of eﬀort diﬀerent to
the one written in the contract if it is sure about the resulting environmental damage. Hence,
the ex-post veriÞability of V (·) eliminates any possibility of strategic behavior, either by the
ignorant, or by the ineﬃcient Þrms. The strategic behavior is reduced to the fact that eﬃcient
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Þrms can deviate by pretending its project is bad and also by pretending they do not know the
value of α.
The optimal menu of contracts has to include an eﬀort choice and a transfer for each type
of Þrm. Note that if the probability that the Þrm learns its type (x) goes to one we have the
classical adverse selection problem; while when x tends to zero we have a world with complete
uncertainty about the type of project. Let Φ(e) ≡ Ψ(e) − Ψ( eα¯). Lemma 1 summarizes the
characteristics of the optimal menu of contracts.
Lemma 1 The optimal menu of contracts under partial ignorance is:
1. For the high type:
e is s.t. Ψ0(e) =
α¯
1+ λ
t = Ψ(e) +Φ(eI).
2. For the low and the ignorance types:
t = Ψ(e) , tI = Ψ(eI)
where, if x ≤ x¯, with x¯ = α¯−1α¯−1+λΦ0(e) < 1, then:
e is s.t. Ψ0(e) =
1
1+ λ
eI is s.t. Ψ0(eI) =
bα
1+ λ
− xv
1− x
λ
1+ λ
Φ0(eI).
If x > x¯, then:
eI and e are s.t. Ψ0(eI) =
1
1+ λ
µ
(1− v)x+ bα(1− x)
1− xv
¶
− xv
1− xv
λ
1+ λ
Φ0(eI).
To understand the result stated in Lemma 1 let us discuss Þrst the extreme cases. Under
full ignorance (x = 0) the solution does not give any informational rents to the Þrm, as it does
not have an informational advantage. When x = 1, we have the traditional adverse selection
contract, the eﬃcient Þrms pollution is unaltered (non-distortion at the top), the ineﬃcient
Þrms pollution is increased, its eﬀort is lowered to avoid giving too much rent to the eﬃcient
one. The distortion is increasing on the proportion of eﬃcient projects (v), on the social cost
of public funds (λ), and on the technological gap, in other words, the better the Þrms project,
the tougher the contract.
The comparison of x = 0 and x = 1 shows that the presence of ignorance has two opposite
eﬀects on the eﬃciency of the contract. On the one hand, there is an allocative ineﬃciency,
because the Þrm is oﬀered a pooling contract that is dominated by the separating one in which
the eﬀort is chosen contingent on the projects eﬃciency. On the other hand, however, the
principal has also a gain from this contract, the Þrms lack of information eliminates its power
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to obtain informational rents. That is, dealing with an informed agent is better from the
perspective of the accuracy of the contract, but it is costly in terms of public expenditures.7
Now consider the case x ∈ (0, 1). The only strategic agent is the eﬃcient Þrm. The value of
its information, i.e., the informational rent of the eﬃcient Þrm is increasing on the level of eﬀort
(Φ0(e) > 0). Hence the best deviation is signing the contract with the highest associated value
of e. In the symmetric information contract, eI > e, because eI is constructed for the expected
eﬃciency level. Therefore, the regulator can start by distorting downwards only the ignorance
contract, as this contract is the most appealing for the Þrm. This distortion is increasing in x
since it is a measure of the asymmetry of the information. This implies that if x is suﬃciently
high (x > x¯), by altering only the ignorance contract the principal would be giving incentives to
the informed party to sign the contract of the bad Þrm (i.e. the value of eI would fall below e).
The regulator avoids this by collapsing both contracts into a single one.8 As x tends to 1, the
optimal contract converges to the one under adverse selection. The remaining characteristics of
the contract are standard. There is non distortion at the top and only the informed good Þrm
gets extra rents. The shape of the contract is presented in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1]
4 Regulation under Partial Ignorance and Informed Third Par-
ties
In this section we study the role of third parties who may own some relevant information on the
state of nature. We assume that the third parties may get to know whether the project to be
implemented is highly damaging for the environment or not, by performing or buying studies of
environmental impact.
We will consider two possible kinds of third parties. First, the environmentalists, deÞned
as a pressure group only concerned about the environmental quality. This determines their
behavior: if they get the information about the nature of the project, the environmentalists will
only disclose it (make it public) if by doing it, they induce a lower level of pollution. In order
to avoid problems of false claimings, we assume that the information the environmentalists get
is hard evidence. Their degree of freedom is whether to disclose it or hide it, but they cannot
falsely claim the project is of a certain type.
The second type of third-parties is given by the independent experts. When required,
these agents perform tests and always disclose their Þndings to the principal. Hence, in terms
7At this point, one may think that the quality of the project generates a similar trade-oﬀ for the regulator
as the presence or absence of ignorance. If the regulator had α¯ (the eﬃciency of the good project) as a choice
variable, he would have to take into account that even if a better project generates less environmental damage,
it is also more costly, since it allows the Þrm to ensure higher informational rents. It can be shown that in this
model, the environmental eﬀect always dominates the informational one. Therefore, it is never optimal for the
regulator to select a highly damaging project.
8This feature of partial pooling when the information in the economy is suﬃciently high is also present in
Kessler (1998).
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of the information they provide, experts are superior to environmentalists. However, while the
environmentalists typically privately pay for the information gathering costs, experts have to be
compensated for the searching costs in which they incur.9
We will consider that the information is costly for the Þrm and for the third-parties. As it is
also the case for the Þrm, the third partiess only decision is whether to buy this signal or not.
The cost of the information is increasing on the accuracy of the test. We denote by Cx the cost
for the Þrm, and by Cz that for the third parties. We assume that the costs are suﬃciently low
to ensure that, in any situation in which the agents have a potential gain from information, it is
worth buying it. We are assuming that the environmentalists and the experts have access to the
same information (z) and do it at the same cost (Cz). Since the acquisition of the information
is unveriÞable for the regulator, its costs are not included in the transfers of the contract. We
assume that an expert has to be compensated for the costs of acquiring the information and
that this is not the case for an environmentalist. Note that we consider that environmentalists
privately pay for the costs of searching because they have stakes in regulation. This assumption
can be relaxed, to encompass the case where the environmentalists expenditures are partially
compensated, provided this coverage is not complete10.
We treat both parties information acquisition analogously as the one of the Þrm. They
obtain a signal (sE) deÞned as follows:
sE = {α} with probability z
sE = {∅} with probability 1− z.
As before, the accuracy of the test (the value of z) is given; eventually the agents can only decide
whether to perform it (alternatively, to buy it) or not.
An important point in our game concerns the timing at which the third party is called to
participate. We consider two timings. In the Þrst one the third party is asked to disclose its
information at the beginning of the regulatory process. In the second one, it is only consulted
after the Þrm has done its announcement. We will refer to these alternative temporal structures
as third-parties Þlter and third-parties check, respectively. Note that the role of the third
party changes from one timing to the other. If the third party plays before (acting as a Þlter)
it is providing information to the principal concerning the type of Þrm he is contracting with; if
it plays after (as a check) it is also monitoring whether the Þrm was truthful when selfselecting.
The timings of both conÞgurations are summarized in what follows.
 Third-parties Þlter timing:
1. The third-party decides whether to buy or not the signal sE.
9The third parties behavior can be seen from an advocacy perspective, considering that in fact their duty
is to search for evidence pro or against the project being highly polluting. In the terminology of Dewatripont
and Tirole (1999), the environmentalists would be close to the advocates who only care about the information
supporting one side, while the experts would be similar to the non-partisans.
10The interpretation for this assumption is that even if an organization like Greenpeace has access to public
funds, its actions are mainly Þnanced by the contributions of its members worldwide.
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2. The principal asks the third-party to voluntarily disclose what he knows.
3. If the Þrms project was not revealed by the third-party, the Þrm can learn (buy) the
signal sF .
4. The contract is designed.
5. If the quality of the project was revealed, the Þrm is given the corresponding optimal
contract (without rents). Otherwise, the Þrm uses its information to selfselect.
6. The project is undertaken.
Under this timing, we make use Þrst of the information of the informed agents. If they fail
to uncover the type of project, the Þrm can have incentives to privately gather information. The
other possibility is:
 Third-parties check timing:
1. The Þrm learns (buys) sF .
2. The contract is designed.
3. The Þrm uses its information to selfselect.
4. The third-party decides whether to buy or not the signal sE.
5. If the contract signed is not the eﬃcient Þrms one, we ask the third-party to disclose
what he knows about the projects eﬃciency.
6. It the Þrm is caught lying it is punished, and its contract reassigned.
7. The project is undertaken.
In this alternative temporal structure, the informed agents knowledge is used to threaten
the good Þrm and prevent it from signing other types contract. The third parties also help
to place correctly those Þrms who remained ignorant after selfscreening.
4.1 Environmentalists
Environmentalists are only concerned by the environmental damage. If they know that the
Þrms project is eﬃcient, the environmentalists will be interested in disclosing it (revealing to
the regulator that the Þrm is eﬃcient). The reason is that an eﬃcient Þrm is asked to exert a
higher eﬀort than a Þrm who is ignorant about its type. Then, in this case, the incentives of the
pressure group and the principal are aligned. On the contrary, when the environmentalists learn
that the Þrms project is ineﬃcient, they have incentives to keep this information for themselves,
since the eﬀort asked to the ignorant Þrm is always higher or equal than the one of the ineﬃcient
Þrm. This is so under both timings. Therefore, the environmentalists report (RE) is:
RE =
(
α¯ if sE = {α¯}
∅ if sE ∈ {1, ∅} .
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After the report of the environmentalists, the regulator updates the probabilities. If the report
is RE = α¯, the posterior is that the Þrm is eﬃcient; if the report is RE = ∅ and given the
environmentalists behavior, the updated probability that the Þrm is eﬃcient (ev) is smaller:
ev = Pr(α = α¯|RE = {∅}) = (1− z) v
(1− zv) < v.
Let us denote the social welfare (gross of Þrms rents) by W if the project is good, by W if it is
bad, and by fW (bα(v)) if the regulator is ignorant about its type:
W = S − V (α¯, e)− (1+ λ)Ψ(e)
W = S − V (1, e)− (1+ λ)Ψ(e)fW (bα(v)) = S − V (bα(v), eI)− (1+ λ)Ψ(eI).
When the environmentalists are used as a Þlter, the objective function of the regulator is:
Wen−f = zvW + (1− zv)x
£ev ¡W − λUen−f¢+ (1− ev) ¡W − λUen−f¢¤
+(1− zv) (1− x)
³fW (bα(ev))− λUIen−f´−Cz − (1− zv)Cx. (3)
Here, as the environmentalists are the Þrst to move, the probabilities are already updated when
the Þrm is asked to selfselect. Moreover, the environmentalists always incur in costly searching
while the Þrm only does it if its type was not revealed by the environmentalists.
When they are used as a check:
Wen−c = x
£
v
¡
W − λUen−c
¢
+ (1− v) ¡W − λUen−c¢¤+
(1− x)
h
zvW + (1− zv)
³fW (bα(ev))− λUIen−c´i−Cx − (1− xv)Cz. (4)
In this case, the Bayesian updating only aﬀects the expected eﬃciency parameter in the ignorance
contract (bα(ev)). In this conÞguration it is the Þrm the one that always acquires information,
while the environmentalists only do it with a certain probability.
As it will be shown later, the average costs of searching will be crucial for the selection
between the alternative conÞgurations. Therefore, hereinafter we denote Czz = ACz and
Cx
x =
ACx. By confronting the two previously explained timings, we get the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 For a given (x, z), in the presence of imperfectly informed environmentalists:
i.- The optimal contract for the Þrm under the two timings is the same.
ii.- The timing with environmentalists Þltering dominates the one with environmentalists
checking if and only if ACz < ACx.
The Þrst part of Proposition 1 makes reference to the allocative eﬃciency attained under
the two alternative timings. We prove that the objective function of the regulator only diﬀers
in the associated costs of gathering information, and that therefore, the optimal contract for
the Þrm is identical. The intuition is related to the expected gains under both timings. Using
the environmentalists as a Þlter, the regulator only pays the informational rents with a certain
probability. On the contrary, using them as a check does not reduce the likelihood of paying the
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rents, but reduces the quantity. The reason is that the deviation possibilities are less attractive
having the environmentalists as watchdogs. We prove that these two eﬀects are quantitatively
equivalent in expected terms, hence the optimal contracts are identical.11 Thus, the key point
is the cost of acquiring the information. The second part of the Proposition states that this cost
comparison determines the best regulatory timing by comparing the average costs of both tests.
This relates to the fact that average costs indicate the eﬃciency of the test, as they provide a
measure of the costs rescaled by the probability that the expenditure results in a real knowledge
of the type of project. As we have shown that the timing has no impact on the contract, the
regulator prefers to place the environmentalists as a Þlter only if their test has lower average
costs than that of the Þrm. Otherwise, the principal prefers to let the Þrm selfscreen Þrst and
use the presence of environmentalists only as a threat.
If the environmentalists privately choose the timing, or if the principal cannot force them
to act when he wants to, then the environmentalists always prefer the checking timing. The
reason is that they induce the same contract as in the Þltering one, but incur in costly searching
less often. However, the incentives to act afterwards would create a problem of credibility for
the environmentalists, because the Þrm will behave as predicted by the contract, only if it is sure
that the environmentalists will ex-post search. This problem is not present if it is the regulator,
who decides when to ask for the third-partys report.
4.2 Independent Experts
We move now to a situation in which the regulator can hire a group of experts who have no
personal interest in the regulatory process, and simply perform the task they have been asked
to. If an expert is contracted, he performs the tests and always truthfully reports his Þndings.
This is equivalent to having a regulatory agency whose duty is to try to screen the Þrm and
give the principal the information he needs for regulating the Þrm.12 Since experts only perform
those tests because we ask them to, they have to receive, at least, the corresponding costs. Thus,
by using experts, the regulator publicly Þnances the projects screening and incurs in the extra
costs λ.
Finally, note that as the experts reporting policy is independent from what they learn
(always report truthfully), if the experts claim that they did not learn the type of project, the
posterior probability that the Þrm is good will remain unaltered. The objective function when
the experts are used as a Þlter is:
Wex−f = z
£
vW + (1− v)W¤+ (1− z) (1− x)³fW (bα(v))− λUIex−f´
+(1− z)x £v ¡W − λUex−f¢+ (1− v) ¡W − λUex−f¢¤− (1+ λ)Cz − (1− z)Cx. (5)
11This result is only true under the assumption that the principal is risk neutral. If he is risk averse, the timing
with environmentalists as a check strictly dominates the one with environmentalists as a Þlter (disregarding the
search costs).
12Laﬀont and Tirole (1991) construct a model of Regulatory Capture, in which the principal asks a regulatory
agency to screen the Þrms. However their analysis is completely diﬀerent from ours since they are interested in
contracts that prevempt the Þrm from bribing the regulatory agency.
12
The one with the experts checking is:
Wex c = x
£
v
¡
W − λUex−c
¢
+ (1− v) ¡W − λUex−c¢¤+ (1− x)z £vW + (1− v)W ¤
(1− x) (1− z)
³fW (bα(v))− λUIex−c´−Cx − (1− xv)(1+ λ)Cz. (6)
Comparing both timings, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 For a given (x, z), in the presence of imperfectly informed experts:
i.- The optimal contract under the two timings is the same.
ii.- The timing with experts Þltering dominates the one with experts checking if and only if
v(1+ λ)ACz ≤ ACx.
The Þrst part of Proposition 2 is analogous to the one of the previous subsection. On the
contrary, the second part presents some new features that are worth explaining. Even if the
important measure continues to be the average costs, new eﬀects arise that inßuence the decision.
First, with experts Þlter we always incur in the extra costs λ while with the other timing,
this only happens with a certain probability. Thus, experts Þlter only dominates provided the
extra cost of public funds (λ) is not too high. The second eﬀect is that while all the informative
reports (RE 6= ∅) of the experts when they are used as a Þlter are useful, when they check some
are ex-post useless. The reason is that in order to keep a credible threat over the Þrms, with the
experts check the regulator has to double screen not only those who reported to be ignorant
about their type, but also the ones who claimed to be ineﬃcient. Therefore, the experts perform
checks that in equilibrium are useless (by the revelation principle no Þrm lies), but that are
needed ex-ante, precisely to sustain the equilibrium. This second eﬀect favors the optimality of
the timing with experts Þlter.
4.3 Experts versus Environmentalists
Now we present a comparison between the situation with experts and with environmentalists.
Experts are more costly, but they are also more eﬃcient because they never hide information to
the principal.
First let us concentrate on the expected beneÞts of the diﬀerent alternatives ignoring by now
the cost of the signal. From our assumption on the behavior of the diﬀerent third parties, it is
obvious that the use of experts can never be inferior in terms of expected revenues than the use
of environmentalists. Proposition 3 states when this advantage is strictly positive.
Proposition 3 If Cz = Cx = 0, there exists a x < 1, such that:
i.- ∀x < x, the optimal contract in the presence of experts dominates the one with environ-
mentalists.
ii.- ∀x ≥ x, the optimal contract in the presence of experts and in the presence of environ-
mentalists are equally eﬃcient.
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Proposition 3 tells us that even if the experts always provide the principal with more infor-
mation in expected terms, this information not always leads to a more eﬃcient contract. If the
test the Þrm has access to is suﬃciently informative (and therefore the probability that a Þrm
remains ignorant about its type after trying the test is low enough), this information surplus
is completely useless. The threshold x¯ corresponds to the level obtained in Lemma 1, from
which on the resulting contract is pooling for the ineﬃcient and the ignorant Þrms. Even if the
environmentalists label as ignorant Þrms they know that are ineﬃcient, and that it is not the
case with experts, in this region this has no eﬀect on the contract because both types of Þrms
are given the same incentive scheme. This result is interesting because it shows how relying
on interested parties information can be optimal, even if the agents do not have incentives to
reveal everything they know. It all depends on whether the principal needs all the information,
or as in this case it requires only the part that is revealed. Obviously if the value of x is below
that threshold, the extra information the experts give is relevant for the principal and therefore
leads to a better contract.
We consider now the revenues net of information searching costs, and compare the two
alternative third-parties, and the diﬀerent timings.
Let us deÞne a threshold for the shadow cost of public funds
λ¯ ≡ xACx − vmax{ACx, ACz}
ACz
.
From the construction of λ¯ it can be seen that if ACx > ACz then λ¯ > 0, but if ACx < ACz it
can be the case that λ¯ < 0.
Proposition 4 If Cx > 0 and Cz > 0 then the best regulatory scenario is:
1. If x ≥ x¯
experts Þlter if λ ≤ λ¯
environmentalists Þlter if λ > λ¯ and ACz ≤ ACx
environmentalists check if λ > λ¯ and ACz > ACx.
2. If x < x¯, there exists a λ > λ¯ such that the optimal conÞguration is the same as above,
replacing λ¯ by λ.
Proposition 4 shows how for low values of λ, the optimal regulatory structure is the one with
experts Þlter. The reason is that when the cost of public funds is small, then the structure
with experts dominates and, as we already highlighted, using the experts as a check entails a
relative disadvantage due to ex-post unnecessary double-checkings. When λ is suﬃciently high
the regulator is better oﬀ by using environmentalists and their optimal position in the timing is
determined by the comparison of the average costs.
It is also worth noting how the threshold x¯ determines two regions, that diﬀer in the amount
of extra cost (λ) that the regulator is willing to bear in order to have an unbiased expert in
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the regulatory process. When x ≥ x¯, we already know by Proposition 3 that the nature of the
third-party makes no diﬀerence in the resulting contract. Hence, the choice is made only by
comparing the costs of gathering information with experts, with those in the conÞguration with
environmentalists. On the contrary, when x falls below the threshold x, the optimal contracts
do not exhibit the feature of partial pooling and hence, by using experts, the regulator acquires
more information that induces a more eﬃcient contract. Therefore, in this region the decision
is not only based in the costs but also in the higher eﬃciency attained with the experts. We
show that this eﬃciency gain decreases as λ increases and this feature, together with the cost
comparison, allows us to ensure that there exists a new threshold for the cost of raising public
funds, higher than λ¯. From this level λ on, it is better for the regulator to deal with informed
environmentalists instead of experts.
5 Endogeneizing the Ignorance
In this Section we go one step forward and consider the possibility that the Þrm decides the
amount of ignorance it wants to suﬀer, which is given by the accuracy of the test it buys. We
compare the choice of the Þrm with the one the regulator would have made. We also provide
some insights on how the third-parties timing selection problem is aﬀected when the level of
ignorance is endogenous.
As we argued in the introduction, due to the nature of our problem, it is reasonable to
consider that the Þrms decision is not perceived by the regulator when designing the contract.
Hence we will develop the analysis in a simultaneous setting between the Þrm (choosing the
value of x) and the regulator (designing the contract).
5.1 Firms Choice of ignorance
In this Subsection we will not consider the eﬀect of the presence of third-parties. The costs of
the test are given by C(x), with C 0(·) ≥ 0, C00(·) > 0. In order to ensure an interior solution for
the Þrms problem, we will assume that C(0) = C 0(0) = 0, and limx→1C 0(x) = +∞. Therefore
the expected proÞts of a Þrm that buys an accuracy x for the signal sF are:
EΠ(x) = xvΦ(max(eI , e))−C(x).
That is, the Þrm always incurs in the cost of searching, and only gains proÞts (informational
rents) if it learns that the project it is endowed with is eﬃcient. In order to be able to derive
solutions for the game, we will consider that cost of the pollution abatement eﬀort is Ψ(e) = e
2
2 .
We also assume that ex-ante the two projects are equally likely (v = 12).
We begin by considering the case in which C(x) = 0 ∀x, this will help us to understand
the principals behavior toward the presence of ignorance. Let us denote by xR the optimal
regulators choice of x, i.e. the level of Þrms information that maximizes social welfare.
Let us deÞne a threshold for λ, λ(α¯) = (α¯−1)α¯
2
1+3α¯+2α¯2−2α¯3 , λ(α¯) is such that λ(1) = 0, λ
0(α¯) > 0,
and there exists a α¯max such that limα¯→α¯max λ(α¯) = +∞.
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Proposition 5 If C(x) = 0, then the regulators choice of x (xR) is:
i.- ∀α¯ ≤ α¯max,
If λ ≤ λ(α¯) then xR = 1 (adverse selection)
If λ > λ(α¯) then xR = 0 (full ignorance)
ii.- α¯ > α¯max, then x
R = 1 (adverse selection)
Proposition 5 brings to place the insight given after Lemma 1 about the conßicting eﬀects
that the presence of ignorance had for the eﬃciency of the contract. Here we show that the
regulators objective function in the absence of costs of gathering information is convex with
respect to the information of the Þrm. Even if more information is costly in terms of the rents he
has to pay, the marginal eﬀect is decreasing because as x increases, the optimal contract becomes
more distorted (precisely to decrease the informational rents). The highest allocative eﬃciency
is attained when x = 1, because there is a perfect assignment of the types to their corresponding
levels of eﬀort. However, this is costly in terms of informational rents paid. Therefore this will
only be the solution provided the extra costs of public funds are not too high.
For values beyond that threshold, it is worth for the regulator to sacriÞce completely alloca-
tive eﬃciency to avoid paying costly rents and hence x = 0. The value of α¯ aﬀects this decision
because it reßects the technological advantage of the good project. The higher the level of α¯, the
more eﬃcient is the good project in reducing the environmental damage, and hence the more
the regulator will be sacriÞcing by choosing x = 0. Thus, the regulator will be willing to incur in
higher costs (λ) in order to contract an informed Þrm. The Proposition shows how if the value
of α¯ is suﬃciently high (beyond a certain threshold α¯max), the principal wants to deal with a
perfectly informed agent no matter the value of λ. However this region is very small, α¯max is
very close to the upper bound of the domain of α¯.13
In the following proposition we will make explicit the relation between the Þrms choice of x,
and what the principal would choose, i.e. the amount of information that the regulator would
like the Þrm to have in the presence of costs of gathering information (C(x) > 0). We will
restrict our analysis to the range of parameter values for which both problems yield interior
solutions.14 Let us denote by xF the level of information acquisition chosen by the Þrm.
Proposition 6 When acquiring information is costly, ∃ex(β,λ) < 1, s.t.:
If xF < ex(β,λ), then xF > xR.
If xF = ex(β,λ), then xF = xR.
If xF > ex(β,λ), then xF < xR.
Proposition 6 has the following interpretation. For each combination of the parameters there
exists a threshold in the level of ignorance (ex(β,λ)) such that, if the Þrm chooses a value of x
13α¯max = 1.918 and recall that the domain of α¯ is α¯ ∈ (1, 2].
14It is straightforward from our construction that the Þrms program always has a unique interior solution. In
the proof of Proposition 6 we provide a suﬃcient condition for this to happen in the program of the principal.
The condition requires that some information is always proÞtable.
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below this value (chooses a relatively high degree of ignorance), then the regulators choice of x
would be even lower. On the contrary, if the Þrms choice exceeds the critical value ex(β,λ), then
the regulator would like to face an even better informed Þrm. Therefore, the Þrms decision
is generically non-optimal, and always moderate with respect to the socially optimal level of
information. The reason for this is the opposite behavior of the marginal beneÞts from an
increase in x, for the Þrm and the regulator. For the regulator, a higher level of x generates
not only a better allocation of eﬀorts but also a decrease in the amount of rents to be paid (the
distortion in the contract is increasing in x). On the contrary, for the Þrm an increase of x
decreases the marginal beneÞts as it makes the contract tougher. This yields a more extreme
behavior for the regulator concerning the Þrms acquisition of information.
At this point, we can analyze the impact of the cost of public funds on the regulators choice
of x. An increase in λ has a direct negative eﬀect over the incentives of the principal to deal with
an informed Þrm: the higher is x, the more likely it is that the Þrm gets extra rents, and these
rents are more costly the higher is the value of λ. However, this is corrected by the contract
because when the cost increases, the contract is distorted more in order to pay less rents. The
following proposition gives the outcome to the interaction of these contrary eﬀects.
Proposition 7 An increase in λ decreases the socially optimal level of information acquisition:
∂xR
∂λ
< 0.
Proposition 7 shows that the direct negative eﬀect always dominates the positive one. That
is, even if the regulator reacts to an increase of λ with a more demanding contract, the overall
eﬀect makes less attractive dealing with an informed Þrm.
One last comment is that we have not found an strategic value for ignorance, as Kessler
(1998) did. The diﬀerence with her analysis is that she considered that the Þrms choice of
ignorance was prior to the design of the contract, and that therefore, the Þrm internalized the
eﬀect of its choice on the contract. Hence, the Þrm strategically chose to bear a certain degree of
ignorance in order to reduce the toughness of the incentive contract designed by the principal.
As we have already argued, we consider that due to the nature of environmental regulation
problems, it is more reasonable to perform the analysis in a simultaneous setting, where no such
strategic considerations are present. Therefore, our analysis relies on a diﬀerent interaction of
eﬀects. What determines our results is the diﬀerence in the value the players give to an increase
in the amount of information available for the Þrm.
5.2 On the Location of the Third-Parties with Endogenous Ignorance
The fact that the Þrms decision is almost never aligned with the regulators gives a new dimen-
sion to the problem with informed third parties. The choice of the optimal timing has to take
into account the diﬀerent incentives to search that they give to the Þrm.
In this subsection we investigate this issue. Due to the impossibility to fully characterize
the results, we only analyze the eﬀects that appear in the selection of the best type of third-
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party, and on its optimal location. We start our analysis by identifying the diﬀerent levels of
information acquisition by the Þrm that the alternative timings induce.
Lemma 2 The Þrms choice of information under the alternative timings is:
xFex−f > x
F
en−f > x
F
en−c = x
F
ex−c.
Lemma 2 shows that the Þrms incentives to gather information are higher when the third
parties are used as a Þlter, than when they are act as a check. Moreover, we Þnd that the
highest incentives for information acquisition are given by the experts, when they are placed at
the beginning of the regulatory process Þltering the Þrms.
With this result in mind, we can now state the main eﬀects that determine which is the
optimal regulatory timing when ignorance is endogenous. These eﬀects are:
1. When the level of ignorance is exogenous, the best regulatory structure is experts Þlter
for low values of λ (Proposition 3).
2. The lower the costs of public funds (λ), the higher the amount of information that the
regulator wants the Þrm to have (Proposition 7).
3. The conÞguration leading to the highest information acquisition by the Þrm is experts
Þlter (Lemma 2).
Therefore, when the extra costs of public funds are small, all the eﬀects point toward the
same timing as the optimal one: experts Þlter. For high cost levels, we showed that environ-
mentalists dominate when the ignorance is exogenous, and it is more likely that the regulator is
interested in restricting the Þrms choice of information, since it is more costly. Hence, when the
extra costs of public funds are important, the best regulatory structure is one with environ-
mentalists, with its location on the timing being determined by the comparison of the average
costs.
6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The objective of this article has been two fold. On the one hand, we have studied the impact
of the presence of ignorance on the environmental regulatory performance, Þrst considering it
exogenous, and afterwards giving the Þrm the capacity to choose the degree of ignorance it wants
to suﬀer. On the other hand, we also analyzed the issue of having other agents (third-parties
diﬀerent from the Þrm and the principal), who posses, or may gather, some relevant information.
We addressed the question of the extent to which the nature of the informed agent, an interested
party (environmentalists) or a neutral one (unbiased experts), and his location in the timing,
aﬀected the regulatory process. The study is developed in a model of regulation of a Þrm that
has been entitled to implement an environmentally damaging project.
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We have chosen to consider that the source of the informational problem is extrinsic to the
Þrm. Contrary to other papers in the literature, in which what the principal did not know was
the cost of the pollution abatement eﬀort, we have assumed that the informational asymme-
try concerns the impact of the project on the environment. We argue that this construction
makes more credible the presence of ignorance and of potentially informed third parties that
can perform, for instance, studies of environmental impact.
We think that some of the results obtained in our analysis have implications that are worth
noting. SpeciÞcally we will focus on two aspects: the choice of the best regulatory structure and
the consequences of relying on the information provided by interested parties (in our case the
environmentalists).
6.1 The Choice of the Optimal Regulatory Structure
The choice of the location of third parties in the regulatory timing can be interpreted as the
determination of who should take the initiative to screen the project and evaluate its environ-
mental eﬀects. The Third-Parties Þlter structure corresponds to a situation in which it is
the public authority who takes this initiative, by asking the agents with technical capacity to
perform the study (the experts or the environmentalists) to do it, leaving the Þrms selfscreening
as a secondary option. Conversely, in the Third-Parties check timing the regulator lets the
Þrm move Þrst, and only uses its capacity to ask for a study as a threat to correct the strategic
behavior of the Þrm.
If we study the actual environmental legislation in force in the EU, we Þnd that the Directive
85/337/EEC, and its amendment Directive 97/11/EC, legislate in favor of the Þrst timing as
they say Member States shall adopt all measures necessary to ensure that, before consent is
given, projects likely to have signiÞcant eﬀects on the environment by virtue inter alia, of their
nature, size or location are made subject to an assessment with regard to their eﬀects.
Our results support this structure as optimal, provided the extra costs that the public sector
performance entails are not too high. Moreover, we Þnd another interesting eﬀect of this timing.
We show that this structure with an ex-ante publicly induced study, not only does not substitute
the Þrms information acquisition, but also induces a higher eﬀort by the Þrm to become informed
about the characteristics of the project it is endowed with.
Hence, these Directives seem to be well designed to protect the environment, as on top of their
direct eﬀect (the assessment of the eﬀects of the project), they add an indirect eﬀect of inducing
the Þrm that will implement the project to invest more in knowing its characteristics, thus
yielding a better allocation of eﬀorts (the actual process of construction) to the environmental
characteristics of the project. However, one should note that the welfare maximizing option for
the regulator can be to avoid paying rents at all cost. This is the case if the ineﬃciency that
collecting fund causes (λ) is very high, as it is in developing countries. We show that, in this
case, the regulator would like to deal with a poorly-informed Þrm, and hence he should place
the checks ex-post.
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6.2 The Role of the Environmentalists as Information Providers
Our work has also some implications concerning the eﬀects of relying on interested parties
information. In our framework, the environmentalists information is hard evidence; this as-
sumption is introduced to keep the model tractable and avoid situations in which both, the
environmentalists and the Þrm, lie and blame each other for misreporting, with a principal
unable to know who actually lied. This construction limits the strategic behavior of the envi-
ronmentalists as it precludes them from, for instance, exaggerating their evidence, in order to
induce a more severe regulatory action. In spite of that, this simple construction still leaves
room for the interested party to aﬀect, through their evidence disclosure policy, the amount
of information the principal posses when designing the policy.
We show that, in our context, the information disclosed by the environmentalists may be
suﬃcient for the principal to take his decision, due to the fact that the presence of ignorance
generates an equal treatment of diﬀerent types (a partial pooling feature) in the optimal incentive
contract. Hence, our model can be taken as a starting point for the analysis of the circumstances
under which the regulatory process may beneÞt from the information provided by interested
parties. This study should be based on the identiÞcation of the relative strengths of several
opposing forces. On the one hand, the lower cost (as it is in our model) and possibly the higher
accuracy (precision) of their information. And on the other, the bias that their selÞsh motivation
will place on their information disclosure. This kind of studies can be very relevant for the design
of future policy measures.
Appendix.
Proof of Lemma 1:
If sF = {∅} or sF = {1} the participation constraint of the Þrm is binding:
UI = tI −Ψ(eI) = 0⇒ tI = Ψ(eI)
U = t−Ψ(e) = 0⇒ t = Ψ(e).
If sF = {α¯}, the Þrm can pretend to be ineﬃcient and reduce its eﬀort. Denoting by γ the
reduction that the Þrm can make in its eﬀort without altering the Þnal level of environmental
damage: V (1, e) = V (α¯, e−γ) ⇒ D−e= D − α¯(e−γ) ⇒ γ = α¯−1α¯ e. With this, the incentive
compatibility constraint of the eﬃcient Þrm with respect to the ineﬃcient Þrm: U = t−Ψ(e) ≥
t−Ψ(e− γ(e)) = Ψ(e)−Ψ(e− γ(e)) ≡ Φ(e) > 0 =⇒ U ≥ Φ(e).
Analogously, for the ignorant Þrm: U ≥ Φ(eI).
Therefore, U = max[Φ(e),Φ(eI)], as Φ0(e) > 0, the condition is equivalent to U = Φ(max[e, eI ]).
The objective function of the regulator under ignorance (W I) is the following:
max
eI ,e,e
W = (1− x) ¡S − V (bα, eI)− (1+ λ)Ψ(eI)¢+
x
£
v
¡
S − V (α¯, e)− (1+ λ)Ψ(e)− λΦ(max[e, eI ])¢+ (1− v) (S − V (1, e)− (1+ λ)Ψ(e))¤ .
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In the undistorted contract, eI > e, hence we start by computing the contract for the case
max[e, eI ] = eI . The resulting optimal contract is:
e is s.t. Ψ0(e) =
α¯
1+ λ
e is s.t. Ψ0(e) =
1
1+ λ
eI is s.t. Ψ0(e) =
bα
1+ λ
− xv
1− x
λ
1+ λ
Φ0(e).
This is the case provided e≤ eI , which holds if x ≤ x¯ < 1, with x¯ = α¯−1α¯−1+λΦ0(e) .
If not, then max[e, eI ] =e= eI . The contract is:
e is s.t. Ψ0(e) =
α¯
1+ λ
eI and e are s.t. Ψ0(e) =
1
1+ λ
µ
(1− v)x+ bα(1− x)
1− xv
¶
− xv
1− xv
λ
1+ λ
Φ0(e).
This holds if x > x. The second order conditions are fulÞlled. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1:
1) As z and x are given constants, to check if the optimal contracts are the same we do not
have to care about the searching costs.
When comparing the objective function, we have to take into account that:
Uen−f = Φ(max(eI , e))
Uen−c = (1− z)Φ(max(eI , e))
Uen−c = Uen−f = U
I
en−c = U
I
en−f = 0.
Algebraic manipulations show that W Ien−f −W Ien−c = v(zCx − xCz), hence the resulting levels
of (e, e, eI) and of (t,t, tI) are the same under both timings.
2) Using the results of 1), we can write:
W Ien−f −W Ien−c = vzx(
Cx
x
− Cz
z
).
Therefore, W Ien−f −W Ien−c > (=) 0 iﬀ Cxx > (=)Czz . ¥
Proof of Proposition 2:
Completely analogous to the previous Proposition. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3:
By Lemma 1, we know that ∃x < 1, such that ∀x ≥ x, e = eI . It can be shown that this
threshold is the same in the programs with experts and with environmentalists.
∀x < x, the contract with experts trivially dominates the one with environmentalists, because
it gives a lower fraction of the population, the pooling ignorance contract that is less eﬃcient
than the corresponding separating one.
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∀x ≥ x, Algebraic manipulations show that the diﬀerence W Iex(e, e = eI)−W Ien(e, e = eI),
only consists of searching costs, and that hence, the two contracts are the same. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4:
1) If x ≥ x, we know by Proposition 3 that the optimal decision only depends on the searching
costs:
1.1.- If Czz <
Cx
x , we already proved in Proposition 1 that W
I
en−f > W
I
en−c. It can be shown
that W Ien−c > W Iex−f iﬀ λ > x
(1−v)Cx
x
Cz
z
.
Analogously, we Þnd that W Ien−f > W
I
ex−c, ∀λ > 0.
1.2.- If Czz >
Cx
x , we already proved in Proposition 1 that W
I
en−f < W
I
en−c. It can be shown
that W Ien−c > W Iex−f iﬀ λ >
Cx
x
−vCz
z
Cz
z
.
Analogously, we Þnd that W Ien−c > W Iex−c, ∀λ > 0.
Combining both regions we Þnd that there exists a λ¯ ≡ xACx−vmax{ACx,ACz}ACz such that,
experts Þlter dominates if λ ≤ λ¯
environmentalists Þlter dominates if λ > λ¯ and ACz ≤ ACx
environmentalists check dominates if λ > λ¯ and ACz > ACx.
2) For x < x, the cost comparison among the diﬀerent speciÞcations is not altered, but there
is also a diﬀerence in the resulting contract, leading to a more eﬃcient Þnal allocation in the
presence of experts. Proposition 3 ensures that the diﬀerent location in the timing does not
alter the resulting contract, the optimal eﬀorts in the contract with experts (eexp) and with
environmentalists (eenv) are:
eenv = eexp are s.t Ψ
0(e) =
α¯
1+ λ
eenv = eexp are s.t Ψ
0(e) =
1
1+ λ
eIexp is s.t. Ψ
0(e) =
bα(v)
1+ λ
− xv
1− x
λ
1+ λ
Φ0(e)
eIenv is s.t. Ψ
0(e) =
bα(v)
1+ λ
− xv
1− x
λ
1+ λ
Φ0(e).
It can be shown that eIenv < e
I
exp, for every x ∈ [0, x). Hence, with experts a higher eﬀort (more
eﬃcient) can be sustained. Both eﬀorts are decreasing on λ and
¯¯¯
∂eIexp
∂λ
¯¯¯
>
¯¯¯
∂eIenv
∂λ
¯¯¯
. Hence as λ
increases, the eﬀorts with experts and with environmentalists tend to converge, what vanishes
the eﬃciency derived from using experts. This, together with the cost comparison ensures that
there exists a λ > λ¯, such that the optimal conÞguration for x < x is the same as if x ≥ x, only
replacing λ¯ by λ. ¥
Remark 1 From here on we will make a change of variable that will be useful for the proofs:
α¯ = 11−β , as α¯ ∈ (1, 2], then β ∈ (0, 12 ]. This change eases the proofs since it makes the deviation
of the eﬃcient Þrm (γ), be linear in β, i.e. γ = βe.
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Proof of Proposition 5:
The objective function of the regulator W I (disregarding the costs of acquiring the informa-
tion), is given by:
W I = (1− x) ¡S − V (bα, eI)− (1+ λ)Ψ(eI)¢+
x
·
v
µ
S − V ( 1
1− β , e)− (1+ λ)Ψ(e)− λΦ(max(e
I , e))
¶
+ (1− v) (S − V (1, e)− (1+ λ)Ψ(e))
¸
.
Let us denote:
W = S − V ( 11−β , e)− (1+ λ)Ψ(e)
W = S − V (1, e)− (1+ λ)Ψ(e)fW = S − V (bα, eI)− (1+ λ)Ψ(eI)
With the Envelope Theorem, we compute the Þrst order condition,
∂W I
∂x
= vW + (1− v)W −fW − λvΦ(max(eI , e)).
This diﬀerence is increasing in x, because:
1.- vW + (1 − v)W − fW is increasing in x as this is the diﬀerence in surplus among the
separating and the pooling contract. This diﬀerence is positive and increasing in x because the
distortion in the pooling level of eﬀort (eI) is more important the higher is the value of x.
2.- λvΦ(max(eI , e)) is decreasing in x because the informational rents are monotonically
increasing in the eﬀort levels and ∂e
I
∂x < 0,
∂e
∂x ≤ 0.
Hence the objective function is convex and we only have to compare the value functions at
the extremes of the domain, for the given cost function, and prior about the types:
W I(x = 0) = S − (D − bαeI)− (1+ λ)(eI)2
2
= S −D + bα2
2(1+ λ)
.
W I(x = 1) = S −D + 1
2
·
e+
e
1− β − (1+ λ)
µ
(e)2
2
+
(e)2
2
¶
− λ
µ
(e)2β(2− β)
2
¶¸
.
Substituting the eﬀorts:
For x = 0 e = 1(1−β)(1+λ) e =
1
(1+λ) e
I = (2−β)2(1+λ)(1−β)
For x = 1 e = 1(1−β)(1+λ) e =
1
1+λ(1+β(2−β)) e
I = 11+λ(1+β(2−β))
and computing the diﬀerence we get:
W I(x = 1)−W I(x = 0) = 1
2
(1+ λ (1+ β(2− β)))
³
1− (2− β)2
´
+ (1− β)2(1+ λ)
2(1− β)2(1+ λ) (1+ λ (1+ β(2− β)))
 .
From here we get:
W I(x = 1) > W I(x = 0)⇔ λ < β
4− 11β + 6β2 − β3 = λ(β).
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It can be shown that ∂λ(β)∂β > 0, and that lim
β→β
λ(β) = +∞, for β = 0.47862.
Undoing the change of variable, λ(α¯) = (α¯−1)α¯
2
1+3α¯+2α¯2−2α¯3 , with limα¯→α¯max λ(α¯) = +∞ for
α¯max = 1.918. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6:
We Þrst provide a Lemma ensuring an interior solution in the problem of the principal.
Lemma: If λ < 2β
8−14β+6β2+β3 , then x
R ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. As C(0) = C 0(0) = 0, and limx→1C0(x) = +∞, then a suﬃcient condition for
xR ∈ (0, 1) is ∂W I∂x |x=0 > 0.
∂W I
∂x |x=0
= vW |x=0 + (1− v)W |x=0 −fW|x=0 − λvΦ(eI|x=0)−C 0(0).
Substituting the eﬀort levels and simplifying, it yields:
∂W I
∂x |x=0
=
1
8(1+ λ)(1− β)2
µ
2 + 2(1− β)2 − (2− β)2 − λ(2− β)
3
2(1+ λ)
¶
.
From here:
∂W I
∂x |x=0 > 0⇐⇒ λ < 2β8−14β+6β2+β3 .
We start the proof of the Proposition with the program of the Þrm, its expected proÞts are:
EΠ(x) = xvΦ(max(eI , e))−C(x).
As the value of x is chosen simultaneously to the design of the contract, the eﬀort levels are
taken as given by the Þrm. The associated Þrst order condition is:
∂EΠ
∂x
= vΦ(max(eI , e))−C 0(x) ≥ 0.
The assumptions on C(x) ensure that the optimal choice of the Þrm (xF ) is always interior.
For the program of the principal, we can take some intermediate results of the proof of
Proposition 5. In particular, the Þrst order condition of the regulators objective function, with
respect to x including the costs is:
∂W I
∂x
= vW + (1− v)W −fW − λvΦ(max(eI , e))−C0(x).
The diﬀerence of the two Þrst order conditions is:
∂W I
∂x
− ∂EΠ
∂x
= vW + (1− v)W −fW − (1+ λ)vΦ(max(eI , e)).
By the argument constructed in the previous proof we know that this diﬀerence is increasing in
x. We only need to evaluate ∂W
I
∂x − ∂EΠ∂x in the extreme values of x, for Ψ(e) = e
2
2 , and v =
1
2 .
For x = 1,
³
∂W I
∂x − ∂EΠ∂x
´
|x=1
= 12
h
e(1− 2bα) + 11−β e− (1+ λ)³e22 − e22 (1− β(2− β)´i .
Substituting the eﬀort levels, we get:
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³
∂W I
∂x − ∂EΠ∂x
´
|x=1
= 12
h
1
2(1−β)2(1+λ) − 2β(1+λ(1+β(2−β))−(1+λ)(1−β(2−β))(1−β)2(1+λ(1+β(2−β))2(1−β)
i
.
It can be shown that
³
∂W I
∂x − ∂EΠ∂x
´
|x=1
> 0, ∀λ > 0, ∀β ∈ ¡0, 12¢ .
For x = 0, and proceeding analogously, we Þnd:³
∂W I
∂x − ∂EΠ∂x
´
|x=0
=
−4(1+λ)(1−β)+4(1−β2 )
2
(1+λ(1−β)2)+β(β(1+λ)−(2−β)3)
16(1−β)2(1+λ)2 .
The sign
·³
∂W I
∂x − ∂EΠ∂x
´
|x=0
¸
= sign
£
β3 − 6β2 + 14β − 8¤ < 0, ∀λ > 0, ∀β ∈ ¡0, 12¢ .
Therefore if the condition in the Lemma holds, we know:
0 < ∂W
I
∂x (x = 0) <
∂EΠ
∂x (x = 0)
0 > ∂W
I
∂x (x = 1) >
∂EΠ
∂x (x = 1)
∂
∂x
³
∂W I
∂x − ∂EΠ∂x
´
> 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7:
We need to study independently two regions, x ≤ x¯ = 1+λ1+λ(1+(1−β)(2−β)) , and x > x¯.
For x ≤ x¯,
∂2W I
∂x∂λ = −
³
((1−β)eI)2
2 +
1
2
e2
2 +
e2
2 − 12 e
2
2
´
− ∂eI∂λ (1+ λ)
³
2−β
2(1−β)(1+λ) +
λβ(2−β)eI
2(1+λ) − eI
´
Substituting the eﬀort levels by the optimal values, and simplifying, yields:
∂2W I
∂x∂λ =
−1
2
·³
(2−β)(1−x)
2(1+λ)(1−x)+λxβ(2−β)
´2
+ 1+(1−β)
2
2(1−β)2(1+λ)2 − λβ(2−β)
3(1−x)(2(1−x)−xβ(2−β))
(1−β)2(2(1+λ)(1−x)+λxβ(2−β))3
¸
Proceeding analogously for the region x > x¯, we Þnd:
∂2W I
∂x∂λ =
−1
2
h
1
2(1−β)2(1+λ)2 +
(2−β−x)2
((1+λ)(2−x)+λxβ(2−β))2
i
+ (2−β−x)(2−x+xβ(2−β))β
2((1+λ)(2−x)+λxβ(2−β))(1−β)2(2−x)
³
1+ λ(2−β)(2−β−x)(1+λ)(2−x)+λxβ(2−β)
´
Due to the impossibility to algebraically obtain the sign of these two expressions, we make
use of numerical calculations. These calculations show that, ∀β ∈ (0, 12), ∀x ∈ (0, 1) and ∀λ ∈
(0, 2) :15
∂2W I
∂x∂λ < 0. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2:
15We have restricted the domain of λ in order to be able to perform the numerical computations. In the
restricted domain we use, we let the public expenditures have a real cost up to three times its nominal one.
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We have to compare the expected proÞts of the Þrm under the alternative timings, these are
given by:
EΠen−f (x) = xevΦ(max(eI , e))−C(x)
EΠen−c(x) = xv(1− z)Φ(max(eI , e))−C(x)
EΠex−f (x) = xvΦ(max(eI , e))−C(x)
EΠex−c(x) = xv(1− z)Φ(max(eI , e))−C(x).
From here it is straightforward to rank the Þrst order conditions and obtain that:
xFex−f > x
F
en−f > x
F
en−c = xFex−c. ¥
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